Abstract-Researches on multicast has explored security challenges faced by group communications. Multicast transport protocols and multicast security protocols need to work closely to provide reliable and secure multicast services. However, there has been comparatively little work carried out to specify how exactly the two technologies can work together efficiently. In this paper, authors present an example of partially integrating the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication (TESLA) protocol and the File Delivery over Unidirectional Transport (FLUTE) protocol. TESLA provides source authorization and data integrity for multicast groups while FLUTE ensures reliability of the multicast transmission. This paper proposes a loose synchronization mechanism for a unidirectional transmission environment, suited to satellite networks. The proposed algorithm was implemented on a testbed with multicast tunnel between University of Surrey and University of Aberdeen and the results are presented in this paper.
INTRODUCTION
IP multicast provides a way to simultaneously disseminate the same packet data to a group of clients. This enables a sender to transmit a single copy of the data, relying on the network to replicate the packets as and when required, along the delivery tree towards multiple receivers. This allows multicast networks to serve large numbers of clients without wasting network capacity.
Many satellite systems natively support IP multicast [13] , allowing connected systems to take advantage of the widecoverage of most satellite down-link footprints. Furthermore, the cost of transmission is independent of the number of receivers; making multicast cost-effective, especially when low cost receive-only terminals are used. Such terminals support unidirectional transmission (i.e. there is no data return path).
To reliably and securely transmit data over satellite using multicast requires close collaboration between the multicast transport technologies and the multicast security technologies. The possibility of (partially) integrating both technologies presents potential gains in the efficiency of transmission. As presented in [18] , Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication (TESLA) [11] is a choice for source authorization for content delivery protocols such as File Delivery over Unidirectional Transport (FLUTE) [1] [17] with many benefit such as loss tolerant and lightweight. This paper examines how, TESLA can be integrated with FLUTE from the Reliable Multicast Transport (RMT) family, providing unidirectional file transmission over IP networks.
FLUTE has been designed using Building Block (BB) architecture. The reliability and congestion control functionalities of FLUTE are provided by the Asynchronous Layered Coding (ALC) framework [13] with the Layered Coding Transport (LCT) BB [13] for session management. FLUTE itself provides a mechanism for signalling and mapping the properties of files to the concepts of ALC in a way that allows receivers to assign parameters for received objects. It is designed to work both with Any Source Multicast (ASM) [15] and Source Specific Multicast (SSM) [16] service models. FLUTE transmits session initiation information in-band using a special object called File Delivery Table (FDT) . Receivers can distinguish the FDT from File objects using the Transmission Object Identification (TOI) filed in the LCT header.
FDT messages are periodically transmitted to all potential receivers in the FLUTE session. An FDT instance consists of the Header, which forms a part of the LCT header extension (EXT_FDT), and the Payload that consists of one or more file description entries composed and structured in accordance to an eXtensible Markup Language (XML) scheme. The TOI=0 in the EXT_FDT tells the receiver that FDT is in the payload.
The FLUTE sender encodes a File for reliability using Forward Error Correction (FEC) and starts transmission based on the Transmission Session ID (TSI) and the TOI values extracted from the FDT. The commonly used FEC schemes are Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) [4] , Reed Solomon [5] , and no-code FEC. After the receiver obtains sufficient packets to decode an object the receiver leaves the session. The FEC Payload ID header in each packet determines the FEC symbol within a block.
A secure group communication system only allows authorized members to send objects to a group. Receivers check the identity of the source to authenticate each packet before accepting it. This procedure is called source authentication. Source authentication is trivial in a point-topoint communication system: the two communication parties can use one pair of keys to authenticate each other. In group communications, a group key is shared by all group members, which makes it challenging to identify the message source and determine its authorization. This authentication is even more challenging when authorized sources are changing. Several solutions have been proposed based on Message Authentication Code (MAC) and digital signature technologies for single source authentication in a multicast group [3] [6] [7] [8] [9] .
TESLA [11] , one of the source authentication approaches, is a standards-track method developed by the Multicast Security (Msec) working group of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It offers efficient source authentication using MAC, rather than a digital signature. It manages to trade time with source authentication in an untrusted group using a one way key chain.
The basic idea of the TESLA system is to achieve asymmetric cryptography by delaying the disclosure of the symmetric keys. The whole transmission time is divided into time intervals and packets sent in each interval have MACs using the same key. The key for interval i will be disclosed to all users in interval i+d. The receiver is responsible for buffering packets until the key for their authentication has been disclosed. After disclosure the receiver can authenticate the packet, provided that the packet was received before the key was disclosed. TESLA requires loose time-synchronization between receivers and the source as well as a bootstrap procedure to configure both receivers and sources before the data transmission.
Many research efforts have been put on FLUTE with reference to multicast security protocols such as TESLA such as [17] . None of them considered how exactly these two protocols can be integrated to provide both reliability and security. And none of them provided solutions for TESLA synchronization for unidirectional file transmissions. This paper is presenting solutions for these two issues by focusing on integrating TESLA with FLUTE with a view of applying in satellite networks.
The paper is organized into six sections. The first section provides a brief introduction to FLUTE and TESLA. The second section presents the integration of the TESLA and FLUTE together with a synchronization mechanism. The third section presents the security consideration of the proposed synchronization algorithm in satellite networks. The forth section is the implementation of the proposed algorithm on a testbed with positive results. Finally, a conclusion is drawn.
II. THE INTEGRATOIN OF TESLA AND FLUTE

A. Tesla Bootstrap with Flute
To enable TESLA to work efficiently with FLUTE, it is necessary to integrate these two protocols. The bootstrap information and synchronization response tags used by TESLA are normally large pieces of information and [10] recommends sending them in separate packets, rather than within data packets. By integrating TESLA with FLUTE, the cost of transmission of these tags can be reduced. The idea is to extend the existing session initialization message in FLUTE, the FDT object [1] , to carry the TESLA Bootstrap information, which contains synchronization information, to disclose the essential parameters including the interval length parameter T_int, together with the FLUTE session information. The bootstrap information will notify the receivers the authentication parameters and also try to synchronize with them as discussed in the next sub-section that will remove the needs of two way communications and the third party services used by TESLA synchronization mechanism proposed in [11] .
Therefore, we do not need the TESLA Bootstrap information tag defined by [11] if we use FLUTE to bootstrap the source and receivers rather than using stand alone messages. Instead, we need new XML tags in the FLUTE FDT object message which should cover all the TESLA bootstrap parameters such as length of time interval, session start time, the initial key, key disclosure delay, the length of key chain, the current time interval index and so on. And example will be shown in section IV.
We do need the TESLA authentication tags which will be appended to each FLUTE data message. The Table I shows this standard authentication tag format. The MAC (k_i, M) in Table I is the message authentication code of the current message M, including the ALC header (including header extensions) and the payload, when applicable. The MAC and disclosed key are arranged in a different order from the format recommended by [10] to follow RFC 4082 [11] .
B. Loose Synchronization of Tesla in Flute
There are two kinds of synchronization methods recommended [10] . One is direct synchronization and the other is indirect. Direct synchronization needs bidirectional signalling between receivers and senders to achieve synchronization that suffers scalability problem when there is a large receiver population causing overload on the source side. However, it will not work in a unidirectional satellite network.
Receivers can also (at greater cost) use a Global Positioning System (GPS)/Galileo receiver to have indirect time synchronization. A stable time reference from GPS (etc.) can be used to generate Network Time Protocol (NTP)/Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) information and to distribute for synchronization service. For details of both direct and indirect synchronization please refer to [10] .
Integrating with FLUTE provides TESLA a lightweight synchronization method without strict requirements on time accuracy. FLUTE periodically transmits the FDT message to enable receivers to join a session, which can be used as a "timing" loop for synchronization. It makes the synchronization dependent on the protocol, rather than a realtime clock. It overcomes the issue of delay from buffering and makes it less sensitive to actual transmission rate.
As mentioned in previous section that time synchronization is needed in TESLA in the safe packet test step. If the receivers and the sources have a common start point (for example the synchronization point in FLUTE), the real-time clock time may be ignored. The formula used in [11] for the safe packet test, which is the highest interval the sender could possibly be currently in: x = floor ((t_j -T_0) / T_int), uses the receivers current local time minus the session start time T_0 with the assumption that receivers have gain synchronization with sources. Therefore, if T'_0 is the time when the receivers received the FIRST (the first packet sent to the group, marked by a sequence number or special header field) data packet from the source in the beginning of a session, we can use the nonclock-synchronized receiver local time t_j, marked by the lower layer to the packet, minus the time T'_0 to replace the (t_j -T_0) in the above formula to calculate highest interval index x the sender could possibly be in. The process is shown in Fig. 1 .
This proposed loose synchronization does not require a response from the receivers, as required for direct synchronization [10] . It makes use of the FLUTE FDT object combined with satellite broadcast to save capacity. It is convenient to extend the FDT in XML format by adding new tags to support this synchronization algorithm. The most attractive feature of the lightweight synchronization algorithm is that it avoids the need for bi-directional communication over the satellite.
However, if a receiver joins a group in the middle of a session, it will loss synchronization because it missed the FIRST packet in the session and cannot calculate the right interval for the source. To compensate this flaw, one has to ensure all possible receivers receive the FIRST data packet. This is not practical in a scenario where receivers may join the session anytime (e.g. to upgrade their software). There is another way to avoid this problem by periodically sending current source interval index to the receivers using the FDT. A receiver has to receive an FDT first to join the data group and at the same time they can use the time point at which they receive the FDT as the synchronization point. The formula used to calculate the highest interval the sender could possibly be in can be modified as: x=floor((t_j-T''_0)/T_int)+I, where I is the interval index the receiver received in the first FDT, and T''_0 is the receiver local time upon receiving the first FDT message. The assumption here is that the source will send each FDT in the beginning of an interval to achieve the synchronization in the order of intervals. To provide consistency in the synchronization algorithm, the receiver can judge from the receipt of a FDT whether it carries a current source interval index. If the index is greater than 0, this means the session has already started and the receiver should refer to the procedure shown in Fig. 2 . Otherwise, the receiver should wait for the session to begin and follow the procedure shown in Fig. 1 .
As recommended by RFC 4082, the interval length T_int should be of the order of the largest delay between the source and any receiver. This delay includes both the transmission delay and the buffering delay. The application tolerable delay should also be taken into account when determining T_int. Applications targeted in this research work are not time sensitive (e.g. bulk file down-load, software distribution). Therefore, we can provide a relatively high upper bound to T_int compared to that used for real-time applications (e.g. streaming applications). FLUTE may require a large buffer at the receiver to receive a whole file. However, if the receiver timely marks the arrival of each packet at the IP layer, the presence of the transport buffer will not affect the packet safe test.
It is not straightforward to determine the transmission delay. The Internet itself may produce a delay long enough to compete with the satellite link delay. Therefore, the delay prediction will vary with different scenarios. In our scenarios, the applications can tolerate large delays, and we could assign a relatively large T_int to compromise the unpredictability. The Geostationary satellite one hop delay is around 250ms. The Internet delay could grow to several seconds due to the network congestion (especially if multicast traffic is afforded a lower transmission priority than other data). We initially make the T_int to be 1 to 3 seconds. RFC 4082 [11] used d =ceil (2m/T_int)+1 to calculate the key disclosure delay, d, to make sure d>=2, where m is the largest delay from the source to any receiver. The key 978-1-4244-5638-3/10/$26.00 ©2010 IEEE disclosure delay, d, 3 was initially chosen with respect to the fact that a multicast bulk file transfer application is not particularly time sensitive.
If a longer delay was observed during a session, new T_int and d could be applied although RFC 4082 recommended not to change. This is due to significant change of the delay between the source and any receivers that makes the current d and T_int not safe anymore. One possible example is when the receiver received a packet, the source might already be in the interval x > d+i. The new T_int and d can be easily rebootstrapped using FDT message. However, T_int is not supposed to vary often due to the security consideration and the network dynamic is not expected high as well. With a d=3, we are actually trying to avoid this situation happening.
As proposed, the FDT will be used for the bootstrap of TESLA to distribute the essential parameters including the T_int, together with the FLUTE session information. The long buffer time will not impact TESLA later providing that synchronization at the beginning is correct and the packet arrival time is marked at a lower layer, i.e. IP layer, which does not have a big buffer. The safe packet test steps of TESLA will not depend on the buffering time. Even when the key chain is changed and receivers will not immediately be aware (due to buffering), all packets received using the key chain transition will be buffered till the receipt of a FDT message carrying the new key chain. Therefore, TESLA is not impacted.
III. THE SECURITY CONSIDERATION
The proposed loose synchronization raises security concern. If the FDT messages are delayed by attackers between the satellite and the end user, the synchronization will fail. This kind of attack is not only threatening the proposed synchronization mechanism but the recommended synchronization methods in the TESLA RFCs, both direct and indirect. This section is to analyze the possibility and impact of such attacks. The attack is analyzed here in two scenarios where requirements for launching such attacks are stated and different factors are analyzed that can decide if it can be detected.
A. Scenario 1
Attack starts before the receiver terminal joins the satellite network.
• Physical layer: the attacker's signal is high enough to suppress the original satellite signal received power, but low enough not to saturate the receiver terminal's amplifier. Our experiments showed that the attacker should generate the signal 19dB higher to override the satellite signal.
• Link layer: the attacker will repeat all carrier signals sending by the satellite. That means he will act as a satellite hub, which is very difficult to do. He will delay only the multicast signals the receiver interested, which means he knows the receiver will join the multicast channel later.
• The attacker need to make the receiver believe the signal he forwarded is from the satellite. He can achieve this only if all relative signals are delivered without modification. This is a sort of hijack of the satellite HUB. However, he will not be able to make the receive join a faked satellite network generated by him because the real satellite HUB should sign all the messages using a secret key.
• If the attacker achieved all the above goals, the integrity protection will be down.
B. Scenario2
Attack starts after the receiver terminal joins the satellite network.
• Physical layer: same as scenario 1. But it will be detected immediately by the terminal because the S/N ratio is having a suddenly dramatic change.
• Link layer: attacker will repeat all carrier signals sending by the satellite. That means he will act as a satellite hub. He have to delay only the multicast signals the receiver interested, otherwise the terminal will loss the satellite connection due to lack of reception of keep-live messages in the right time.
However, his step-in can be immediately detected by the terminal because same messages might be received multiple times.
• The attacker will have difficulty to cheat the receiver terminal that his signal is the original satellite signal in both physical layer and link layer.
The conclusion is that such replay attack is very difficult to launch in terms of both equipment and receiver activity prediction (It is much easier to destroy the receiver's terminal physically.). Such attack can be immediately detected by the receiver terminal in the scenario 2. It can break the TESLA authorization procedure in scenario 1 if the attacker can really launch such attack. He can cause more damage than a DoS attack with the right authentication key he received before the end users. The attacker can simply cause more serious DoS attack by purely suppressing the original satellite signal received power on the receiver's terminal or even burn down the amplifier of the receiver terminal using extreme high power transmission.
In the commercial broadcasting services, such attack is not a serious threat due to the very limited receivers will be affected and an attacker will not benefit much from this kind of attack. In our multicasting services, such attack will not result in serious damage as well. Purely from research point of view, it can be easily solved as well by adding timestamp to each satellite data frame on the satellite HUB. Any delay can be immediately detected on the receiver terminal due to the synchronization between the satellite HUB and itself. The point is that this extra timestamp will cost money and it is not worth for such a weak threat.
978-1-4244-5638-3/10/$26.00 ©2010 IEEE However, for a Digital Video Broadcasting -Satellite services to Handhelds (DVB-SH) service, this attack could be much more serious where the attacker can jam a terrestrial relay station which will affect hundreds of users in its coverage. The attacker can also use high transmission power to suppress the relay station's signal and pretend to be a relay. Such attack can be more difficult to detect because terrestrial relay signal is expected besides the original satellite signal.
IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION
The proposed integrated authentication mechanism has been implemented in C# and validated on a testbed. The implemented contains two pieces of software: the sender and the receiver. The sender generates FDT messages and adds new tags to it as proposed in section II-A and periodically multicast them to a pre-defined multicast channel. It also generates a one-way key chain using SHA1 function provided in C# with key size of 20 bytes. The key chain is used to calculate the MAC for each data packet during the FLUTE session. The following code is a FDT example with TESLA parameters:
The interval length in the above code is 3 seconds. The key chain length is 20. The session start time is 633727989518437500s. The current interval index is 7, the key disclosure delay is 3 and the last key of the key chain is On the receiver side, the software listens to the FDT in the corresponding multicast group when it joins the session and gets synchronized with the sender using the proposed method and carries out the packet safe test upon each coming packet using the formula described in section II-B.
The implementation has been validated on a testbed which connected two networks in University of Surrey (UniS) and University of Aberdeen (UoA) respectively. In the UniS, a Cisco 2811-sec/k9 router is connected to the internet via our university intranet and firewall to UoA where a Rendezvous Point (RP) is hosted. The Cisco router was used as a designated router (DR) with a computer running sender in UniS and the other computer running receiver in UoA. A Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) tunnel is established between the DR and the RP in order to carry the multicast sessions.
In the experiments, the sender and the receiver is no synchronized using any method recommended by [11] . Their time is around 1hour and 4 minutes different during the experiment. The result shows that the proposed algorithm works well when the source and receiver is not timely synchronized and bandwidth has been saved with the integrated approach. Figure 3 and Figure 4 shows the integrated authentication implementation works well on two machines, acting as source and receiver respectively, which have different local time. In Figure 3 , the sender output the data, the disclosed key, and the MAC for the last packet it sent in the time interval 4. After that, it displayed the 5th FDT it sent in the 5th interval with the correct interval index. The clock at the right side of Figure 3 shows the current local time is 09:39:56. Figure 4 shows the output result on the receiver side that displayed the data has been successfully received for the last packet sent in the interval 4 after it passed the 4 steps of safe packet test where its local time, shown at the right side of the figure, is 10:43:26, which is different from the sender's time. In additional to the synchronization success, the proposed algorithm is expected to save bandwidth after combining the TESLA bootstrapping signaling and the FLUTE FDT signaling and the test results proved it. This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE Globecom 2010 proceedings. Figure 6 . Screen shot on receiver computer Figure 5 shows a Wireshark® capture result that 36010 bytes have been transported in a short time slot around 1 minute using a separated FLUTE and TESLA approach. Figure  6 shows the same session but using integrated approach as proposed that only transmitted 35086 bytes. The integrated approach saved about 2% bandwidth to transmit the same mount of data. It is because the separated approach introduced more overhead for more signaling packets. In our test, there are not much data generated which definitely contribute the figure of bandwidth saving. However, in a satellite network, extra signaling implies more overhead due to encapsulations. Moreover, integrity protection is recommended for FDT [17] and TESLA bootstrapping messages in the separated signaling case and the overhead will get even bigger. So our algorithm does help save the expensive bandwidth in a satellite network.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
This paper has examined an idea to integrate TESLA with FLUTE to save bandwidth. In the proposed method FDT, the FLUTE File Delivery Table, is used to convey the TESLA bootstrap information. A new synchronization mechanism is proposed that eliminates the requirement for using a time server (e.g. Network Time Protocol, NTP, or Global Positioning System, GPS). This method is particularly attractive in a unidirectional transmission environment, (e.g. a satellite network without a return channel). Analysis of the TESLA interval length, T_int, and the key disclosure delay, d, has been presented for FLUTE over such a satellite network and the choice of parameter is shown to be not affected by the proposed synchronization mechanism.
Security concern has been analyzed in terms of man-in-themiddle attack that can override the satellite signal and gain users trust to fail both the proposed synchronization and the recommended synchronization method in TESAL RFCs. The result showed that such kind of attack is extremely difficult and will not have serious impact in the commercial satellite broadcast/multicast networks.
The proposed algorithm has been implemented using C# and validated on an inter-university testbed. The test result shows that the proposed algorithm works successfully and it saves bandwidth comparing with the separated TESLA and FLUTE approach.
